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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). By Order dated
August 26,2002, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
The appeal herein was timely filed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Appellant was required to arrange for the appointment

of a personal representative for a deceased defendant prior to moving for
substitution of proper parties under Utah R. Civ. P. 25.
Standard of Review: The granting of a motion to dismiss a complaint based
upon a party's failure to make a motion for substitution in a timely fashion under
Rule 25 is a question of law subject to review for correctness. Stoddard v. Smith,
27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001).
2.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing this

case with prejudice.
Standard of Review: The dismissal of a case with prejudice is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. OfAdjustment, 893 P.2d
1101,1104-1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
1

APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE
The Court's analysis of Utah R. Civ. P. 25 will be dispositive of the
resolution of this case on appeal:
UTAH R. CIV. P. 25. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be
made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than
ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement
of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action
shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or
more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be enforced
survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants,
the action does not abate. The death shall be suggested upon the record and the
action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving parties.
2

APPLICABLE STATUTES
Utah statutes which may be of assistance to the Court in deciding this appeal
are as follows:

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-103.

Share of heirs other than surviving spouse.

(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving
spouse under Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving
spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated below who
survive the decedent:
(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as defined in
Subsection 75-2-106(2);
(b) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if
both survive, or to the surviving parent;
(c) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the
decedent's parents or either of them per capita at each generation as defined in
Subsection 75-2-106(3);

3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 75-2-106 (1998). Definitions--Per capita at each

generation-Terms in governing instruments.

(3)(a) If, under Subsection 75-2-103(l)(c) or (d), a decedent's intestate estate
or a part thereof passes "per capita at each generation" to the descendants of the
decedent's deceased parents or either of them or to the descendants of the
decedent's deceased paternal or maternal grandparents or either of them, the estate
or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares as there are:
(i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest the deceased parents or
either of them, or the deceased grandparents or either of them, that contains one or
more surviving descendants; and
(ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving
descendants, if any.
(b) Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one
share.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-104

(1975). Claims against decedent-Necessity of

Administration.
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal
representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and
actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure
prescribed by this chapter 3. After distribution a creditor whose claim has not been
barred may recover from the distributees as provided in section 75-3-1004 or from
a former personal representative individually liable as provided in section
75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of
the decedent to enforce his right to his security except as to any deficiency
judgment which might be sought therein.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12(l)(a)

(1991). Survival of action for injury to person

or death upon death of wrongdoer or injured person—Exception and restriction to
out-of-pocket expenses.
(l)(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the death of
the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person or the personal
5

representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the
wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general
damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action brought by the Plaintiff Wayne J. Soules
against the Defendant Dale H. Curtis. Before the case could be tried in the District
Court, the Defendant Curtis passed away and, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 25, the
Plaintiff timely moved the court to substitute other parties for the deceased
defendant prior to the expiration of 90 daysfromthe date death was suggested on
the record by the Defendant's counsel. The District Court granted the Defendant's
Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Decedent's heirs as parties
upon the ground that the Decedent's heirs were not the Defendant's personal
representative, and that the Plaintiffs Motion failed to contain a notice of hearing.
Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss this case, and the District
Court granted that motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal
followed.

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Defendant herein, Dale H. Curtis, passed away on June 20,

2001, and on December 10,2001, a Notice of Suggestion of Death was duly filed
with the District Court by his counsel. (R. at 35; Aplt. Addend, at 1)
2.

Counsel for the Plaintiff independently established the date of the

Defendant's death as June 20,2001, and obtained the names of each of the
Defendant's surviving siblings by reviewing the Defendant's obituary published in
the Salt Lake Tribune on June 24,2001. (R. at 72; Aplt. Append, at 9)
3.

Within 90 days of December 10,2001, the Plaintiff filed with the

District Court a Motion to Substitute Proper Parties for Deceased Defendant. (R.
at 65; Aplt. Append, at 2)
4.

Counsel for the Plaintiff served each of the Deceased Defendant's

heirs with Notice of the Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Proper Parties for
Deceased Defendant, allowing those parties a period of 14 days within which to
interpose any objection to the Plaintiffs motion. (R. at 75, 78, 85, 118; Aplt.
Append, at 12,15,22, 51) None of the Defendant's heirs at any time objected to
the Plaintiffs motion. (Entire Record)
5.

Counsel for the deceased Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the

Plaintiffs motion for substitution of party on March 5,2002, upon the ground that
7

no personal representative had yet been appointed for the estate; that the heirs were
not proper parties herein; and that no notice of hearing on the Plaintiffs motion.
(R. at 92,94; Aplt. Append, at 29, 31)
6.

Over the Plaintiffs objection, the District Court dismissed this case

with prejudice on June 12,2002. (R. at 150; Aplt. Append, at 69)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
STRIKING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE PROPER PARTIES
BECAUSE NO PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN
APPOINTED FOR THE DECEASED
DEFENDANT AND BECAUSE NO
NOTICE OF HEARING WAS PROVIDED
TO THE HEIRS WITH THE NOTICE OF
INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THEM AS
PARTIES.

Neither Utah R. Civ. P. 25, nor any applicable statute, requires that a
personal representative be appointed for an estate prior to filing a motion
under Rule 25 to substitute proper parties for a deceased defendant. Any such
requirement is hypertechnical and does not comport with the procedure outlined in
Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001). Further, while it is true that the
Plaintiff did not set a hearing on his motion to substitute proper parties, and thus
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9

did not give notice of any such hearing to the heirs, Rule 25 should not be read to
permit dismissal of the case in these circumstances.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN DETERMINING TO DISMISS
THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE.

The District Court erred in failing to consider the totality of the
circumstances in dismissing this case with prejudice; had it done so, it should have
determined that an injustice would result if the case was dismissed with prejudice.
Consequently, assuming it was proper to dismiss the case at all, the Court abused
its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
STRIKING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE PROPER PARTIES
BECAUSE NO PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN
APPOINTED FOR THE DECEASED
DEFENDANT AND BECAUSE NO
NOTICE OF HEARING WAS PROVIDED
TO THE HEIRS WITH THE NOTICE OF
INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THEM AS
PARTIES.

The District Court determined, in effect, that, because no personal
10

representative was appointed for the decedent's estate prior to the timely filing of a
motion to substitute proper parties under Rule 25, no proper parties were brought
before the Court and thus this case should be dismissed. Such a reading of Rule 25
and the applicable statutes is unduly harsh and not in accord with the analysis of
the Utah Supreme Court in Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001). There, the
Court first expressed its concern that the failure of the decedent's counsel to
identify a person who may be substituted as a proper party "would open the door to
a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating the
representative of the estate within 90 days," id. at 550, citing Rend v. Kay, 415
F.2d 983,986 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Court rejected the view of federal courts
holding that identification by the decedent's counsel of a person who may be
substituted is implicitly required by Rule 26. Significantly, however, the court also
expressly rejected any requirement that the party seeking substitution actually
know the identity of the person to be substituted whenfilingthe motion:
However, with or without notice of the appropriate substitute, our
holding does not unduly burden the party filing the motion for
substitution. Under our interpretation of our rule 25, a party filing a
motion for substitution does not have to know the identity of the
person who may be substituted when filing the motion. A party, such
as plaintiff in this case, may simply file a motion seeking to substitute
the "Personal Representative of the Estate of the Decedent" or
"John/Jane Doe." Once the motion is made, the proper person to be
substituted for the decedent may be ascertained in due course, by
11

discovery if necessary. Consequently, there is no concern that a
failure to identify, in the suggestion of death, a person who may be
substituted for the deceased party, will result in "tactical
maneuver [ing].
M a t 551.
Thus, the dismissal of this case by the District Court permitted the very evil
the Supreme Court sought to address in Stoddard, by placing the burden upon the
Plaintiff of "locating the representative of the estate within 90 days." Under
Stoddard, it is only the timely filing of the motion for substitution that matters;
indeed, it is unnecessary even to know the names of the persons who might be
properly jointed as parties. The effect of Stoddard is to allow all such issues as the
name of an appropriate personal representative and the timing the appointment to
be addressed after the timely filing of the motion for substitution. The Stoddard
plaintiff did not prevail in that case solely because he failed to file his motion for
substitution in a timely fashion; here, however, all parties in the instant case agree
that the Plaintiffs motion was timely filed.
Nor does the Utah Supreme Court in Stoddard impose any requirement that
the plaintiff assume the burden of arranging for the appointment of an appropriate
personal representative within 90 days. To the contrary, the Court only required
that the motion seek to substitute the unnamed personal representative or
12

"John/Jane Doe." Here, the Plaintiffs motion went much further, and ascertained
the names of all of the decedent's heirs at law, serving them with a copy of his
notice to substitute them as parties so that one or all of them could subsequently be
named as personal representatives, following the rule outlined in Stoddard.
Inexplicably, however, the District Court concluded, in effect, that it was the
Plaintiffs burden to arrange for the appointment of a personal representative, then
seek to join that specific individual in the instant case, all within the applicable 90
day period set forth in Rule 25. Yet nothing in the rule itself or any applicable
statute requires any such result.
In the Court below, the Defendant relied upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-104
for the proposition that "[n]o proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment
of a personal representative." The cited statute, however, is inapplicable to this
case. First, there is no claim to "revive" or "commence." The claim of an injured
party is not extinguished merely by the death of the tortfeasor; rather, it expressly
survives the death of the wrongful party.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-11-12(1 )(a)

provides that such causes of action "do not abate upon the death of the
wrongdoer." (Emphasis added.) The same statute goes on to provide that the
injured party has "a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal
13

representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages ...". Thus,
while it is clear that, at some point, a personal representative must be named and
must appear as the substituted party, the Utah probate code does not require that
this occur prior to the filing of a motion to substitute proper parties after a
suggestion of death. The District Court's holding to the contrary should be
reversed.
Additionally, however, the District Court also determined that the Plaintiffs
failure to include a notice of hearing with his Notice of Plaintiff s Motion to
Substitute Proper Parties was also fatal to his claims. (R. at 129; Aplt. Append, at
54) On the notice issue, Rule 25 provides that "[t]he motion for substitution may
be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons." However, at the time notice of the Plaintiffs motion was
served on the heirs at law, no hearing had been scheduled on the motion;
consequently, it was not at that time possible to provide the heirs with any notice of
the non-existent hearing. Rule 25 should not be read so inflexibly as to require that
a hearing on the motion for substitution must be scheduled prior to giving the heirs
notice (and, in this case, an opportunity to object) of the Plaintiffs intention to
14

name them as substituted parties. Simply put, neither the deceased Defendant nor
his heirs at law are prejudiced in any fashion by the Plaintiffs decision not to serve
them with any notice of hearing until after a hearing was actually scheduled. It is
clear that, once the hearing is scheduled, notice of the hearing will be served on the
heirs in the same manner as prescribed by Rule 25. Under these circumstances, it
is respectfully submitted that it was reversible error for the District Court to
dismiss the case on this basis.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN DETERMINING TO DISMISS
THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE.

This Court has held that whether a case is properly dismissed with prejudice
for failure to join a necessary party is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
See Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. OfAdjustment, 893 P.2d 1101, 1104-1105
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Subsequently, in Donahue v. Smith, 27 P.3d 552 (Utah
2001), the Utah Supreme Court held that the District Court in that case properly
dismissed a case with prejudice for failure to comply with the timeliness
requirements of Rule 25. In Donahue, unlike the present case, an automobile
accident victim failed at any time to file his motion to substitute proper parties
15

under Rule 25, despite a notice of suggestion of death filed by the opposing party.
Instead, the accident victim sought a belated extension of time within which to file
such a motion. The Utah Supreme Court held that, under Utah R. Civ. P. 41, the
lower court did not err in dismissing the case with prejudice, and that it would also
not have been reversible error to dismiss the case without prejudice. Id. at 555 n.3.
The Court's holding in Donahue was implicitly supportive of the Court of
Appeals's holding in Ludlow that such rulings are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court did abuse its discretion in
dismissing this case with prejudice under the facts and circumstances herein. In
Donahue, the accident victim took no actions at all to comply with Rule 25 until
after the time period provided by that rule had already run. Here, the accident
victim took steps to comply with the rule and filed his motion for substitution in a
timely fashion. In Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court held that a determination whether to dismiss for
failure to prosecute required the Court to balance the need to expedite litigation
and efficiently use judicial resources with the need to allow parties to have their
day in court. Such a determination requires the Court to consider the totality of the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. In particular, the Court considers (1) the
16

conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the
case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward;
(4) the difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by reason of the
delay; and (5) most importantly, whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
M a t 697-698.
In the instant case, short of shouldering the burden of finding an appropriate
personal representative for the deceased Defendant, the Plaintiff did everything
possible to bring the proper parties before the Court so that the underlying merits
of the dispute could be presented. He arranged for personal service upon the
decedent's heirs with his motion to substitute them as parties; and he timely filed
his motion to do so with the Court. The Defendant, however, made no effort to
advise the Plaintiff of who should properly be appointed as personal representative
of the estate to allow the case to proceed. Under these circumstances, and
particularly in light of the harsh result — which would deny the plaintiff any right
to be heard on the merits of his tort claim — it is respectfully submitted that the
District Court abused its discretion in determining to dismiss this case with
prejudice.

17

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court should be reversed and this case
should be remanded for trial on the merits of the Plaintiffs claims.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2002.

^•>^cl iV^^
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Plaintiff

kUt
iomas N. Thompso1
Attorney for Plaintiff
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the following, this 25th day of November, 2002.
Terry M. Plant
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